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NOTES AND COMMENTS
connection with the National Selective Service System, The United
States Employment Office, and the Local Boards. Because of the small
number of men involved, this program was fairly successful. 39
In spite of all the aforementioned problems, national re-employment
planning is imperative-planning that squares with facts, yet at the
same time, projects the kand of nation and world in which we wish
to live. Such plans become goals, and goals are incentives to conduct.
Therefore it seems wise to outline objectives for a broad re-employment
program: 40
(1) To endeavor to place each soldier in contact with a job a month
before his release from active duty.
(2) To make as early contact with the soldier as possible, in order
to bolster his morale by giving him tangible evidence of the
activities of the government in safeguarding his employment.
(3) To utilize the services of the United States Employment Service
and the affiliated Employment Services as the primary means
of finding jobs for unemployed soldiers.
(4) To supplement the work of the State Employment Agencies in
order to insure complete placement of soldiers by the assist-
ance of local Te-employment committees affiliated with each
local board.
(5) To put the job placement of soldiers on a sound basis by in-
suring that each man is placed m a job for which he is suited,
and seeing that the man is presented with references to utilize
fully his skill and training.
(6) To see that the employer and the public generally look upon
the army trained man as offering the superior type of em-
ployee.
(7) To coordinate re-employment with industry through the use
of clearinghouse committees from employer organizations work-
ing jointly with local board re-employment committees.
(8) To grant financial assistance to the ex-serviceman so that he
may obtain home, furniture, tools, stock, land, or other necessary
things for commencing an employment or occupation.4i
MOBILIZATION OF MANPOWER
The Nation is waging total war. To be successful against totalitar-
ian governments we must either mobilize both material and human
resources in the manner of our opponents, or establish a more efficient
alternative of our own making. Mobilization of manpower should be
handled so that not only our human resources will be victoriously
39 An Ohio theatre employee was reinstated after his discharge from
army service when the district attorney prepared to sue his former
employee. Indianapolis Star, March 6, 1942, p. 1, col. 4.
40 See Johnny Gets His Gun, Keeps His Job (Aug. 17, 1940) BUS. WK.
15; TOBIN & BIDWELL, MOBILIZING CIviLIAN AwmRICA (1940) app.
252; Re-employment & Post War Planning (1942) 220 .ANNALS 186.




utilized, but so those individuals affected can appreciate that they toil
for freedom and not bondage.
The term "complete mobilization of manpower" is used to designate
a government program which takes every man and woman and places
Im where his present or potential capacities can be most efficiently
utilized in the prosecution of total war. One way to mobilize industrial
manpower is to conscript labor.' Today "conscription of labor"2 is
usually discussed without mention of a similar conscription of industrial
assets. In this regard, labor conscription is distinguishable from mili-
tary conscription in that " . . . the former contemplates forced labor
in private plants operated for profit while the military forces are en-
gaged in the direct service of the government." s While the man in
uniform can feel that his sacrifices contribute to the cause of his home-
land, certain proponents of labor conscription may wonder whether the
man in overalls, compelled to work at the time, place, and for the
pay the government deems necessary, can long be convinced that his
inconvemences aid the America he loves rather than the corporate
shareholders.
To date the methods used by the United States to harness its
human resources differs not only from that of the totalitarian nations
but also from those methods used in other democracies.4  Germany,5
1 A War Department representative stated that labor conscription was
unnecessary and would confuse. See Heanngs before Committee
on Military Affairs on S. 25, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) pt. 2,
142. That labor should be unfettered, see General McArthur in
Heanngs before War Polictes Comm. (1931) 374.
2 That "Conscription of Labor" has become an "epithet" rather than
a definitive term, see Hoague, Brown, & Marcus, Wartime Con-
scription and Control of Labor (1940) 54 HARV. L. REV. 50, 99.
But see Note, Defense and Labor Compulsion (1941) 9 INT. JURID
ASSN. MONTH. BULL. 109.
8 See Note, Defense and Labor Compulswn (1941) 9 INT. JURID. ASS'N.
MONTH. BULL. 109; BARUCH, TAKING THE PROFITS OUT oF WAR 33.
BING, WARTIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENTS (1921) 233.
4 See Note, Labour %n the National Defense Programme of the United
States (1941) 44 INT. LAB. REV. 42.
5 Each worker is required to carry a "labor book" giving his training
and occupational history. HAMBURGER, HOW NAZI GERMANY HAS MO-
BILIZED AND CONTROLLED LABOR (1940) 11 et seq., de Wilde, Defense
Economics of the U.S.: Labor Problems (1941) 17 FOR. POL. REP.
162, 163. After the invasion of Poland neither leaving nor firing
was allowed without official permission. Note, Labor Policy
in Germany (1940) 50 MONTH. LAB. REV. 1374, 1375. Hiring may
also be prohibited. ROBSON, LABOR UNDER NAZI RULE (1940) 25.
Hiring of workers employed in agriculture at any previous time
has been prohibited. Id. at 21. Boys and girls from 10 years
upward can be forced to work for varying periods. Note (1941)
53 MONTH. LAB. REV. 607,612.
In 1916 Germany first required labor of all males between 16 and 60.
TOBIN & BIDWELL, MOBILIZING CIVILIAN AMERICA (1940) 116. The
Hitler regime has long sponsored measures having the effect of
labor conscription. de Wilde, Germany's Wartime Economy (1940)
16 FOR. POL. REP. 86, Hinrichs, Supply ofi Labor for Essential In-
dustres (1942) 19 PROC. OF POL. & SOC. SO. 440, 449.
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Italy,6 and Japan7 early conscripted virtually all classes of labor. Great
Britain subjected industrial manpower to government control when
it passed the Control of Employment Act 8 and the Emergency Powers
(Defense) Act; 9 Australia has conscripted a labor army for war work;'0
New Zealand has a similar statute, but is still relying upon voluntary
action;" and South Africa has acted to protect mining and agn-
culture.' 2
Advocates of labor conscription in this country usually assign the
0 Since April 1940 all persons over 13 years, including women, have
been subject to mobilization. (1940) 17 BULL. OF INT. NEws 504.
7In July 1939 compulsory labor service from the ages cf 12 to 60
was ordered under the General Mobilization Act of 1938. Ogishma,
The Organzation of Employment sn Japan (1940) 41 INT. LAB.
REV. 154, 146. The order did not apply to government employees,
doctors, veterinarians, apothecaries, seamen, and office clerks
whose salaries exceeded 100 yen per month. Note (1940) 50 MONTH.
LAB. REV. 1376. In September 1940 the "pass-book" system was
instituted, under which the employer takes custody of the book.
The worker cannot leave to take a new job as without the pass-
book in the new employer's possession no legal relation can exist.
Brady & Oshima, War Organization in Japan in STEINER, ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS OF WAR (1942) 12. With 90% of all farmers in govern-
ment-controllect guilds, agricultural labor control is simplified.
Ibid.
82 & 3 GEo. vi, c. 104 (1939). The Minister of Labour was given au-
thority to prevent advertising for workers. Schoenfeld, Develop-
ment of British War Labor Policy (1941) 52 MONTH. LAB. REv.
1079; Murphy, The War and British Workers (1941) 20 HARV.
BUS. RFv. 94. The first orders issued under the Act applied to
carpenters, joiners, bricklayers, shipbuilding workers, repairmen,
merchant seamen, coal miners, building contractors, civil engineers,
and truckers. SPIEGEL, THE ECONOMICS OF TOTAL WAR (1942) 153-4.
03 & 4 GEO. VI, c. 20 (1940). Mr. Bevm in cooperation with the Min-
ister of Agriculture has used this power to prevent the move-
ment oT workers from coal mining and agriculture. Note, The
Labor Market (1940) 139 ECONOMIST 69; Note, County War Agri-
cultural Executive Committees (1940) 104 JusT. P. 7.
10 N.Y. Times, March 3, 1942, p. 1, col. 7. Up until that time there
was nothing to induce an unemployed worker to accept a productive
civilian occupation, though there was some attempt to steer men
in that direction. Walker, Wartime Labour Problems in Australia
(1941) 44 INT. LAB. REV. 389, 396; Note (1941) 53 MONTH. LAB.
REV. 607, 611. The policy toward the munitions industry was
stricter, however, as a man engaged m war work could not be
hired by another employer nor could certain tradesmen (as elec-
trical fitters, mechanics, forgers, and machimsts) be hired at all
without permission from the Department of Labour. Walker,
Wartime Labour Problems sn Australia (1941) 44 iNT. LAB. REV.
389, 395.
11 The Minister of National Service has the power to compel labor by
persons from 16 years upward. Social Security returns were
used to compile a national register. Note (1941) 53 MONTH. LAB.
REV. 607, 611.
12 In these occupations, one may not volunteer without the authoriza-
tion of his employer and an Exemption Tribunal. Note (1941)
53 MONTH LAB. REV. 607, 608. Even India has compelled some
labor for the purposes of training munitions workers. (1940) 17
BULL. OF INT. NEWS 900.
19,2]
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lack of a skilled labor supply, mal-distribution of what supply emsts,
and the prevalence of defense strikes as the chief reasons for the
measure."3 As to the latter, neither unions nor management are
without guilt. Viewed realistically, organized labor in certain instances
is attempting to take advantage of its present superior bargaining
position which its leaders realize will be gone after the war. To meet
these instances management, under the guise of patriotism, may
be seeking to prevent further union inroads and in some instances
to nullify labor gains of the past few years.14 While labor has done the
expected in opposing complete mobilization,5 a few representatives of
management have viewed such a measure as the answer to their present
difficulties without considering what far-reaching effects such a pro-
gram night have upon the economic system winch makes profits pos-
sible. Even compulsory arbitration of labor disputes runs far short
of a plan that asks employee groups to give up all their rights, and
management none. The federal government has taken steps to resolve
the problems created by strikes and lockouts16 without resorting to
a modern equivalent of involuntary servitude. 17
There can be little argument that volunteering for military service
and the Selective Service program (although the provision for occupa-
tional deferments' 8 has prevented the nmnediate diminution of skilled
forces) coupled with the demand for increased war production is now
making unprecedented demands upon the available labor supply.19 This
"3 See Hoague, Brown & Marcus, Wartime Conscnption and Control of
Labor (1940) 54 HARV. L. REV. 50, 51; Note, Defense and Labor
Conscnption (1941) 9 INT. JURM. ASS'N. MONTH. BULL. 109, 110.
24 Congressman Anderson of New Mexico has asserted that systematic
attacks are being made on labor for the purpose of diverting at-
tention from huge war profits. 88 Cong. Rec., March 17, 1942, at
2687. That military men are generally unsympathetic toward
strikes at any time and would likely use their power to conscript
labor to resolve strikes, see Note (1940) 9 INT. JURID. ASS'N MONTH.
BULL. 16.
"5AFL, CIO, and the Railway Brotherhoods opposed conscription of
labor. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, July 31, and Aug. 7, 1940.
IsThe War Labor Board, composed of twelve men equally divided be-
tween labor, industry, and the public, is the chief group concerned
with resolving labor difficulties in defense plants.
17 "Enforced and involuntary service for a private master is and has
been clearly and repeatedly referred to by our Supreme Court
as slavery inhibited by the Thirteenth Amendment." BARUCH,
TAKING THE PROFITS OUT OF WAR 34. For a discussion of the con-
stitutionality of labor conscription, see Hoague, Brown, & Marcus,
Wartime Conseption and Controu of Labor (1940) 54 HARV. L.
REV. 50, 82-89.
18 Sel. Ser. Reg. §§ 622.21 and 622.22 (1942).
i9See Mee, Personnel Problems sn a War Economy M STEINER, ECO-
NOMIC PROBLEMS OF WAR (1942) 3. That there is greater possi-
bility of a general labor shortage now than in 1917, see Wolman,
American Labor sn Another War (1939) 18 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 80, 84.
But see Hinrichs, Supply of Labor for Essential Industres (1942)
19 PROC. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SOi. 440, 443 (recognizing specific
demands but contends employers overgeneralize as to a general
shortage. Immigration does not seem to be feasible now, though it
[Vol. 17"
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applies to agricultural as well as factory labor.20 Nevertheless,
the emsting labor supply . . can be made adequate in time to meet
any production schedules that have been laid out so far. .- 21
Throughout the last decade little effort was made to train ap-
prentices,22 so abundant was the available pool of skilled operatives.
Many of those constituting that surplus, though now generally older
men, may be given "refresher" courses. 23 Likewise, many of the four
or five million unemplobed of last October2 4 can be trained for skilled
or sen-skilled functions. Those who have been dropped from pay-
rolls because of conversion to war production or because the system
of priorities has extinguished the consumers' industry in which they
found their means of livelihood,25 present another group sufficiently
was used on a small scale in the last war. Leighton, The Crisis Sn
Man Power (1942) 184 HARPER's 459, 460; Christenson, The Labor,
Market and National Defense (1941) 6 IND. UNIV. BUS. REP. 38, 40, 48.2 0 
"By 1943 a real general shortage of farm labor may begin to de-
velop." Wickard, Agricultural Supplies for War (1942) 220 AN-
NALS 125, 129. Germany has imported many thousands of farm
laborers from Italy. Note (1941) 43 INT. LAB. REV. 584; (1940) 17
BULL. OF INT. ,-Ews 224, 504, 511. That lower standards have been
prescribed for non-Germans, see (1940) 51 MONTH. LAB. REV. 313.
2. Hinrichs, Supply of Labor for Essential Industries (1942) 19 PRoc.
ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCL 440, 452.
22 "It was not until the spring of the year 1941 that there was wide-
spread recognition of the magnitude of the training problem ... "
Hinrichs, Supply of Labor for Essential Industries (1942) 19
PRoc. ACAD. OF PoL. & SOc. sm. 440, 443. Skilled workers in 1939
were at least 13%, and perhaps 20%, below the 1930 level. See
Slichter, The Present Nature of the Recovery Problem (1940) 18
PROC. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. sCI. 3.
23 "During the long period of unemployment after 1930, many workers
lost their skills . . " See TOBIn & BIDWELL, MOBILIZING CIVILIAN
AMERICA (1940) 141; Note (1942) 100 FACTORY MANAGEMENT 60.
The Kokomo, Indiana, Chamber of Commerce brought more indus-
try there upon the basis of a census which uncovered many
skilled workers of this type.
24 See Hinrichs, Supply of Labor for Essential Industries (1942) 19
PROC. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. Sm.; Note, Defense and Labor Compul-
sion (1941) 9 INT. JURID. ASS'N. MONTH. BULL. 109, 110.
25 Governor Van Wagoner of Michigan has estimated that there are
200,000 auto workers among the "priority unemployed." H.R.RF.
NO. 1553, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941) 41 (national defense ngra-
tion); Note, Priorities Unemployment (1941) 10 INT. lURID ASS'N.
MONTH BULL. 57.
Yet the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that even Detroit
will experience shortages by the fall of 1942. See Hinrichs, Sup-
ply of Labor for Essential Industries (1942) PROC. OF POL. & SOC.
SCI 440, 446. Obviously, the solving of the short-run problem
should not be the guiding consideration. See NEAL, INTRODUCTION
TO WAR ECONOMICS (1942) 84. Germany and England attempted
to alleviate this problem by adjusting the closing of non-essential
industries to the openings in war industries. de Wilde, Germany's
Wartime Economy (1940) 16 FOR. POL. REP. 86, 88. During the
first four months of the present war unemployment in England
increased by 250,000. SPIEGEL, THE ECONOMICS OF TOTAL WAR (1942)
69. Germany has been free of this problem in the present war,
but so serious was it in 1914 that a program of public works
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familiar with the mass production process that they will be able to per-
form related operations in less time than is ordinarily required to
tram a worker from the beging.26 The recent amendment to the
Selective Service Regulations which gives deferment priority to men
(now deferred on dependency grounds) who are contributing to the
war effort2l will encourage many skilled workers to remain in or to
enter defense employment. Abandonment of race and nationality
discriminations would make inmediately available an unascertained
number of already trained or partially trained men.28 Finally, the
experience of Great Britain and Germany has shown that women
can be trained in certain skills vital to war production.29 In all
for the same amount and quality of work.3o
The present distribution of skilled labor,3i as in the last war,3 2 is
was proposed. GREBLER & WINKLER, THE COST OF THE WORLD WAR
TO GERMANY AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (1940) 24.26 For a description of the "Buffalo Plan" designed to shift this group
into defense jobs, see H.R.REP. NO. 1553, 77th Cong., 1st sess.
(1941) 73-84.
27 Sel. Ser. Reg. §§ 622.31 and 622.31-1 (ffective April 23, 1942);
see Note, Dependency (1942) 17 IND. L.J. supra.2 8 Negroes, Jews, and persons of German and Italian origin are those
chiefly affected, even in non-defense plants. See Labor Shortages
and the Restoration of Employment to Citizen Workers (Fed. Sec.
Agency 1941) passim; Hinrichs, Supply of Labor for Essential
Industres (1942) 19 PROC. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCL. 440, 451;
Leighton, The Cnsss n Man Power (1942) 184 HARPERS 459, 464.
29 German experiments particularly have been quite detailed. See
Note (1941) 44 INT. LAB. REV. 617, 640; of. Gosselk, Betrebsschutz
be? der Frauenarbeit (April 1941) R.K.W.NACHRICHTEN 5 (trans-
lated (1941) 44 INT. LAB. REV. 213).
Older women, whose husbands work in industrial plants, ad-just most quickly. Peters, Woman's Great Share in the Total
War sn Germany, and Woodward, Woman's Great Share in the
Total War in BHritaiu N.Y. Times Mag. (Mar. 9, 1941).
The British have reserved certain occupations for women.
Note (1941) 43 INT. LAB. REV. 572. Women constituted one-fifth
of the labor force in Canadian arms plants by June 1941, and it
was reported that women would provide 60% of all new labor in
the aircraft industry in the United States. Out of a sample
group of 1,894 occupations including some defense industries, the
Federal Security Administration indicated that only 331 were
definitely unsuitable to women. SPIEGEL, THE ECONOMICS OF TOTAL
WAR (1942) 70.
3oIn Australia, unions have opposed the introduction of "cheap female
labor." The courts have alleviated the difficulty, however, by
prescribing the same pay where the woman does a man's work.
See Walker, Wartime Labour zn Australia (1941) 44 INT. LAB.
REV. 389, 401.
31,, it was inevitable that general labor shortages should begin
to develop in some localities." Hinrichs, Supply of Labor for
Essential Industries (1942) 19 PROC. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 440,
445. See Leighton, The Crsis in Man Power (1942) 184 HAPERS
459, 464 (Flint pattern makers). The Bureau of Employment Se-
curity has classified the registered unemployed by skill and loca-
tion. Clogue, Labor Supply and the Defense Program (July 1940)
3 soc. SEC. BULL. 161.
32 TOBIN & BIDWELL, MOBILIZING CIVILIAN AMERICA (1940) 122. Hoague,
Brown, & Marcus, Wartime Conscnption and Control of Labor(1940) 54 HARV. L. REV. 50, 57.
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the chief justification for positive measures of labor control. It is usually
presumed that labor supply will move around to meet the demand for
a price. But in spite of the large-scale nugrations which are a con-
sequence of the defense program,33 skilled workers have shown amaz-
ing lack of mobility.34 The North Central states ordinarily supply most
of the value added by manufacture, 35 and it is in that area that the
greatest expansion in defense industry has occurred. 36 Already wide-
spread "pirating" has been reported.37 In this section of the country
particularly, industry may find it necessary to resort to "dilution" 38
and "upgrading"3 9 in the event the sources of labor supply indicated
above become exhausted.
Apparently with the realization that the effective solution of these
problems demands unification of governmental policy, the President by,
Executive Order recently established a War Manpower Commission
of ne members with the Federal Security Adrmistrator as Chair-
man.40 It is significant that the order places the real power in the
Chairman to " . . establish basic national policies to assure the
most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's
33 See H.R. REP. NO. 1553, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941) passsm (national
defense nugration); Bolles, The Great Defense Migration (1941)
183 HARPERS passsm. In a given month 6% of new Indianapolis
workers were new residents, while in San Diego the figure was
20%. Spencer & Burns, Labor Supply (1941) 30 SURVEY GRAPHIC 619.
34 See Bliss, Problems Posed For Industry (1942) 220 ANNALS 106, 113
(New York machinists).
35 The Great Lakes area supplied 31.% of all value added by manu-
facture in 1939. Ibid.36 The Great Lakes States, 27.5%; the entire central area, 51%. Ibid.
37 See de Wilde, Defense Economies of the U.S. Labor Problems (1941)
17 FOR. POL. REP. 162, 167. That the facilities of the U.S. Em-
ployment Service will be msufficient to halt labor pirating, see
Mee, Personnel Problems sn a War Economy in STEINER, ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS OF WAR (1942) 4.38 Concentrating skilled labor on the more complicated operations,
and bringing in the untrained to handle the simpler tasks under
the direction of skilled laborers. See Christenson, The Labor
Market and National Defense (1941) 6 IND. UNIV. BUS. REP. 38,
42-43. Faced with a large group of unemployed but with a scarc-
ity of skilled men, Australia has diluted the skilled workers in
defense industries. Note (1941) 43 INT. LAB. REV. 576.
39Promotion and transfer of partially trained workers to the place
where they can be most effective. See NEAL, INTRODUCTION TO WAR
ECONOMICS (1942) 76. In industries where promotions are neces-
sary management has been advised to employ men not subject
to the draft, as failing to promote a man merely because he is
subject to the draft lowers morale. See Mee, Personnel Problems
Created by Industrnal Mobilization (1941) 6 IND. UNIV. BUS. REP.
58, 62-3.
4o Executive Order Establishing the War Manpower Commission sn the
Executive Office of the President and Transferring and Coordinat-
ing Certain Functions to Facilitate the Mobilization and Utiliza-
tion of Manpower, April 18, 1942. The other members of the
Commission are representatives of the War, Navy, Agriculture,
and Labor Departments, the War Production Board, the Labor
Production Division of the War Production Board, the Selective
Service System, and the Civil Service Commission.
1942]
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manpower. ," as the other members need only be "consulted." All
agencies concerned with the critical industrial, agricultural, transporta-
tion, and governmental employment activities must conform to the
regulations of the Chairman.
The effect of this new development is potentially sweeping. Force-
ful exercise of the powers conferred and effective administration by
the Chairman and the executive officer of the Commission will go far
in creating a national manpower policy.41 The creation of the Com-
mission will facilitate the collection of vital occupational statistics. It
will make it possible to place every productive person where he is most
useful, and assure him that he is contributing to the prosecution of
the war.
41 See Fuller, Mobilization of Manpower (1942) 106 NEW REPUBLIC 233
passim; Note (Feb. 1942) 100 FACTORY MANAGEMENT 58.
